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The present article is devoted to analysis of the anti-essential “I”-definition given by Ernst Mach in his 
work “The Analysis of Sensations” and shows Mach’s influence on the contemporary philosophers in 
the whole and on Otto Weininger in particular, using the methods of interpretation and reconstruction. 
The benefit of this article is that it proves that O.Weininger’s critique of Mach’s “I”-definition is based 
on monad theory of the German philosopher G.W. Leibniz. Moreover it also shows to a considerable 
extent a key element of Austrian philosophical tradition regarding German concept of individuality 
and history, which is in religious confrontation of Protestantism and Catholicism. Consequently 
Weininger’s approach is one-of-a-kind, because after he converted to Protestantism he denied in such 
a way Austrian idea and made his choice in favor of German philosophy which united him with Kant’s 
ideas who established ethical principle of unlimited freedom of mind. 
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The period since 70-s of XIX century is 
related to blooming of philosophy in Austria, 
empirism and positivism became widespread, 
focus on psychical plane led to that it was often 
considered as the only reality. Austrian positivism 
was characterized by anti-metaphysician approach 
and it inspired physicists to apply to philosophy. 
Ernst Mach was the best known and famous 
among them, he was one of the most outstanding 
and influential thinkers in Austria at the turn of 
the XIX-XX centuries. 
Although the name of Ernst Mach has 
become famous due to his profound contribution 
to physics connected with ballistic shock-waves 
in aerodynamics as well as due to outstanding 
achievements in thermodynamics, optics, 
acoustics and mechanics and the scientist himself 
did care about his reputation first of all among 
natural scientists, he worried less about the opinion 
of professional philosophers, it is considered that 
at the turn of XX century he developed a real 
philosophy of human knowledge. Due to his works 
in philosophy Mach has became very popular and 
gained great influence not only on professional 
philosophers, but also on contemporary poets, 
writers and literature critics. 
Ernst Mach’s ideas had a profound influence 
on philosophy development at the end of XIX-
beginning of XX century not only within 
Austria, but also outside the former Habsburg 
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Monarchy. However, the reason for such great 
Mach’s influence is first of all connected with the 
fact that his ideas corresponded to mentality of 
the epoch and reflected that identity crisis which 
Austrian culture and Austrian self-consciousness 
experienced within the period preceding collapse 
of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In this sense 
Weininger’s critique of the “I”-definition shows 
to a great extent this polemics and identity crisis 
with potential German projection of the future of 
Austria which can be found in many works. 
Probably no other publication of expanded 
version of the doctoral dissertation has become so 
popular and gained so much fame as it happened 
to the main work of Otto Weiningers “ Sex and 
Character: a principal investigation”, in which 
23-year old author comes to global and quite 
discouraging conclusions. Since its publication 
in 1903 the book has gone through so many 
editions nearly thirty by 1940 and in 1980 it was 
republished again. And at the same time no other 
book stirred so much controversy as this diatribe 
against women and Jews because of the author’s 
vagaries about deadly enmity of male and female 
nature.
Otto Weininger was born in a rich Jewish 
family of a gifted goldsmith Leopold Weininger 
and received a very good education. At the age 
of 18 he spoke fluently Greek, Latin, French and 
English languages, as well as Spanish and Italian. 
Later he also acquired passive knowledge of 
Swedish and Norwegian languages. Weininger 
studied philosophy and psychology at the 
University of Vienna. The doctoral dissertation 
entitled “Eros and Psyche” he wrote under 
scientific supervision of Friedrich Jodl, who 
deemed Weininger personally repugnant, 
Friedrich Jodl confirmed it himself in his private 
correspondence. Considering Otto Weininger’s 
work to be abound in extravagancies and crudities, 
Jodl was astonished to see its overwhelming 
success after it was published as a book entitled 
“Sex and Character”, because he considered a 
dissertation to be purely a scientific investigation, 
while its appearance in the book form “smacked 
of wish –fulfillment in its speculations about Jews 
and women”1. 
In summer 1902 on the day he was awarded 
with the doctoral scientific degree Weininger 
converted to Protestantism. In October 1903 less 
than a year after the book “Sex and Character” 
was published in the consequence of the deep 
depression Otto Weininger committed a suicide 
by shooting himself in the chest in the hotel room 
where Beethoven had died. 
In his book “Sex and Character” Weininger 
proceeds from principal opposition of male and 
female nature. By equating sexuality with women 
and diagnosing hysteria as a malady solely 
peculiar to women caused by conflict between 
exclusively sexual nature of women and chastity 
ideal, Weininger assumed that women are free 
to choose between motherhood and prostitution; 
for a third is not given “tertium non datur”2. 
Since the former merely disguises the latter, the 
only way for men to elude harmful influence of 
women is simply to cease procreation. “Such 
vagaries notwithstanding, Weininger embodied 
something pure and edifying. Even Freud 
conceded that the young man had about him a 
touch of genius”3. 
According to Weininger in contrast to 
women primitive consciousness model, their 
non-productivity and sensuality, males are 
characterized by high level of consciousness 
development, creation and asceticism; in the 
book Weininger “identifies- up to absurdity- male 
nature with intellect, creativity, free will, but at 
the same time male nature is more and more 
separated from body, instinct, life and nature”4. 
In the chapter named “Logic, Ethics and the 
Ego” of the book “Sex and Character” Weininger 
sharply criticized anti-essential “I”-definition 
given by Mach according to the tradition 
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established by David Hume (1711-1776) and Georg 
Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799). D. Hume’s 
theory is based on the idea that knowledge begins 
with experiment which consists of perceptions 
and which in their turn are divided into 
impressions (sensations and emotions) and ideas 
(remembrances and imagination images). “In 
accordance with English tradition Hume analyses 
knowledge as external and internal experience. 
Consequently the experience generates in us ideas 
which are divided into simple ideas-impressions 
and ideas-reflections in relation to emotional 
states (pleasantness-unpleasantness). D. Hume 
raises a question what influences on imagination 
activity, why in the end different languages and 
different objects are learned and described in a 
similar way”5. 
D. Hume defines his philosophical concept 
of the “I” in the following way “… when I 
investigate in the most intimate way something 
named by myself as my “I”, I always face some 
or another individual perception of warmth or 
coldness, light or shade, love or hate, suffering or 
delight. I just can not catch my “I” as something 
existing beside perceptions and I can not possibly 
capture anything else than some perception. If my 
perceptions are temporally ceased as it happens 
in a deep dream then during all this time I do not 
realize my own “I” and thus the I can be really 
considered as not existing”6. 
Ernst Mach acknowledged that Hume was 
his forerunner in “I” critique: “… well ahead of 
me David Hume introduced in this “Treatise of 
Human Nature” analysis of “Self” and destroyed 
the illusion of some remaining “I””7. In this 
relation E. Mach follows Austrian philosophical 
tradition according to which “… almost all 
philosophical works of Austrian thinkers contain 
analysis of sensations as a source of knowledge, 
substantiality of the “I”, possibility of the thing-in-
itself. In the light of these assumptions D.Hume’s 
philosophy seemed to be promising, fruitful and 
prospective for inheritance and development of 
ideas”8. 
According to Weininger D.Hume’s critique of 
“I” are reduced to the result that the “I”-definition 
is only a “bundle” of different “perceptions” 
which are in a continuous ebb and flow. Weininger 
emphasizes that the “I”-definition is abolished 
due to Hume, because Hume being himself quite 
certain that he had none “Self” “proposed to say 
nothing about a few metaphysicians who appeared 
to rejoice in another kind of ego; … he dared to 
suppose that the majority of mankind, leaving 
the few peculiar and metaphysicians out of the 
question, were, like himself, mere bundles”9. 
Weininger finds the “I” critique of the 
German satirist and author of aphorisms of 
XVIII century Lichtenberg to be bolder than 
Hume’s critique. Lichtenberg was an outstanding 
German scientist and publicist, who was very 
popular among many Austrian thinkers due to 
his philosophical sayings written in the form 
of posthumously published aphorisms. In his 
philosophical fragments Lichtenberg “throws 
doubt upon power of traditional word formulas, 
claims to prove attitude to the most remarkable 
events and calls to look for grounds not to 
believe”10. 
In his work Weininger defines Lichtenberg 
as the philosopher of impersonality, who corrects 
the conversational expression “I think” (ich 
denke) into an actual “it thinks” (es denkt), as 
more corresponding to the reality. Weininer 
writes: “He regards the ego as a creation of the 
grammarian. In this Hume had anticipated him, 
in as much as he also had declared, at the end of 
his analysis, all disputes as to the identity of the 
person to be merely a battle of words”11. 
Ernst Mach in his “Analysis of sensations” 
determines the “I” or “ego” as “a relatively 
permanent complex of memories, moods, feelings, 
joined to a particular body (human body)”12. The 
border dividing the “I” from the external world 
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is changeable according to Mach, the boundaries 
of the “I” can be so extended that they involve 
the whole universe. However being without exact 
boundaries and remaining undetermined these 
boundaries are exposed to permanent external 
changes. 
In order to step out of the “I” boundaries 
Mach enters a definition of the elements, which 
are primary to the “I”. “The primary fact is 
not the ego, – Mach writes, – but the elements 
(sensations)… The elements constitute the I”13. 
Mach demonstrates this interconnection by the 
example of the sensation green: “What does it 
mean that I have “the sensation green”? It signifies 
that the element green occurs in a given complex 
of other elements (sensations, memories). When 
I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, 
then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary, 
familiar association. That is all”14. On Mach’s 
opinion the introduction of the elements let us 
to eliminate “controversy between the “I” and 
the world, sensation or appearance or object»15, 
because we treat only the interconnection of the 
elements. 
While the “I” interpreted by Mach is a part 
of the world and can be determined just as an 
“abstract idea”, as “empirical construction” or an 
“assumption” consisting of particularly ordered 
groups of the elements such as sensations, views, 
memories and thoughts joined to an organism, 
then the “I” interpreted in such a way happens 
to be in danger to be isolated in itself. There is a 
certain difficulty to accept sensations, feelings and 
views of other humans on the base of sensations 
and feelings of your own “I”. Mach supposed that 
this problem can be resolved if the physical, the 
psychological and the intellectual are equated to 
each other, then the problem of someone else’s 
“I” does not appear any more, because the own 
“I” and someone else’s “I” are considered to be 
only changeable com complexes influencing 
each other: “As my neighbor’s sensations are not 
directly transferred to me as well as mine to him, 
thus I’m entitled to consider the same elements 
in which I dissolved the physical as elements of 
the psychical. The physical and psychical contain 
therefore the common elements”16. 
Mach similar to many other philosophers of 
his time considered the psychical as a sensation, 
that is why when he equates the psychical and 
the physical, he proceeds from the assumption 
that the psychical can be described similar to the 
physical. The physical phenomenon represents 
a wave, but a human does not perceive it as the 
wave, but he or she hears it as the sound. The 
color is light refraction, but a human sees it as 
the color but not the light. Therefore there are no 
grounds to distinguish the physical understood 
as waves from the psychical, because both 
can be described in the form of waves. Thus 
according to Mach everything outside sensations 
does not possess the status of the reality to the 
full extent, and any representation even such a 
general representation or definition like the “I” 
is actually a result of the intellectual activity in 
which perception experience is used. Perceptions 
consist of complexes of sensations which in their 
turn consist of individual sensations-elements. 
That is why the psychical and the physical 
represent in fact all the same. 
In the words of the French researcher of 
Viennese Modernity Jasques Le Rider the “I” 
represented by Mach as to be “beyond redemption” 
(das unrettbare Ich) expressed in the form the 
functional interconnection of the elements has 
actually become “methapsychological crown of 
the natural scientist’s philosophy who proposed 
the Viennese public a new version of the monistic 
doctrine of Positivism”17. Mach’s reductionism 
reducing the “I” and the world to “the complex 
of sensations” and allowing to analyze them 
as elementary biophysical processes has 
significantly damaged the belief in the presence 
of some permanent identity, and the poets, critics 
– 1149 –
Larisa V. Niz’eva. «Waiting-Hall of Perceptions»: O.Weininger’s Critique of Mach’s I-Definition
and writes responded on it variously. If we speak 
about the negative reaction, then we have to state 
that Weininger showed the tendency to overcome 
Mach particularly brightly. 
His protect he expressed on the pages of his 
book “Sex and Character”. Weininger disproved 
Mach’s theory which represented the universe in 
the form of a coherent mass, while the individual 
“egos” are represented as points in which the 
coherent mass has of greater consistency. He 
critically considers that Mach refuses the presence 
of any reality beside sensations, according to 
Mach the only realities are perceptions which are 
connected in one individual relatively strongly. 
Therefore Weininger concludes that the “I” is 
not a real but a practical reality, which “can not 
be isolated, and therefore, the idea of individual 
immorality must be rejected”18. That is why 
Weininger characterizes mockingly Mach’s 
definition of the “I” as “a mere waiting-hall of 
perceptions”. 
Weininger either does not agree with Mach’s 
opinion that the “I” as a complex of the elements 
is in a permanent stream of changes. “It is clear 
that to be able to say that A is A, to establish 
the permanence of the conception through the 
changes of experience, there must be something 
unchangeable, and this can be only the subject. 
Were I part of the stream of change I could not 
verify that the A remained unchanged, had 
remained itself. Were I part of the change I could 
not recognize the change,”-Weininger wrote19. 
When he speaks about ethics, Weininger 
recognizes “truth, purity, faithfulness, uprightness 
with reference to oneself”20; he states that “duty 
is only duty to oneself, duty of empirical ego to 
the intelligible ego”21.
In the Chapter named “The “I” Problem and 
Genius” Otto Weininger sets chaos of sensational 
perceptions in opposition to “such spiritual unity 
of the “I” with the world whole under which the 
“I” does not disappear, but containing within 
itself the whole universe it asserts its absolute 
transempirical value”22. Under genius Weininger 
understands a particular state of absolute 
freedom from the reality laws. According to 
Weininger only the man of genius is able to 
recognize clearly his own “self”, because the man 
of genius is capable to distinguish all the finest 
details between himself and other people. That 
is exactly why the man of genius “is enabled to 
distinguish the fact that others are different, to 
perceive the “ego” of other men, even when it is 
not pronounced enough for them to be conscious 
of it themselves”23. 
Weininger states that the man of genius has 
Kantian ethical consciousness. He writes: “The 
man of genius is he whose ego has acquired 
consciousness. … It is only he who feels that every 
other man is also an ego, a monad, an individual 
centre of the universe, with specific manner 
of feeling and thinking and a distinct past, he 
alone is in a position to avoid making use of his 
neighbors as means to an end, he according to the 
ethics of Kant, will trace, anticipate and therefore 
respect the personality in his companion (as part 
of the intelligible universe) and will not merely be 
scandalized by him. The psychological condition 
of all practical altruism, therefore, is theoretical 
individualism”24. 
When Weininger speaks about the I-monad 
he means the theory of the German philosopher 
G.W.Leibniz (1646-1716) “whose ideas gained 
for a long time a foothold in Austrian culture 
as opposed to German, where the authority 
of Leibniz’s followers was shaken by Kant’s 
“Critique of Pure Reason””25. 
In accordance with the theory of Leibniz the 
world represents a united building, its integrity 
is provided by the principle of pre-defined. 
The central definition of the theory, written by 
Leibniz during his stay in Vienna in his best 
know philosophical work “Monadology”, is a 
monad, which is a simple spiritual substance. 
– 1150 –
Larisa V. Niz’eva. «Waiting-Hall of Perceptions»: O.Weininger’s Critique of Mach’s I-Definition
The monad is closed, it has “no windows”26, and 
even God, having created it, cannot change its 
pre-determined goal. Meanwhile each monad 
is considered to be a mirror of the whole huge 
universe and thus all the laws of this universe, 
no matter if they are physical or chemical, are 
reflected and applied to the monad. 
God is the greatest and the most complicated 
monad which brings the world into harmony. 
Leibniz wrote on this occasion: “God is also said 
to be a simple substance but it is the only one 
which is necessary and without a body attached. 
Creation is a permanent state, thus [monads] are 
generated, so to speak, by continual fulgurations 
of the Divinity. Any perfection comes from being 
created while imperfection is a limitation of 
nature”27. 
The monad is inherent to each element of the 
universe particularly ordered in the form of the 
monad hierarchy. Both humans and animals have 
monads, however, if animals have a capability 
of perception, then humans are capable not 
only to perceive but also to apperceive, which 
means reflection capability. It is not possible to 
know God, but a human is able to know himself. 
“But knowledge of necessary and ageless truths 
distinguishes us from simple animals and gives 
us possession of mind and sciences, raising us up 
to knowing ourselves in God. And namely this is 
called reasonable soul or spirit in us”28.
The human “I” is exactly one of the monads 
and it is given a particular meaning in German 
culture based on Protestantism from which in its 
turn German individualism originates. In this 
connection it becomes clear that in his choice 
between the Austrian catholic idea and the 
German protestant idea Weininger prefers the 
latter and actually he confirms it by his conscious 
converting to Protestantism more than one year 
before his suicide. 
Weininger comes to a conclusion that the 
denial of the subject (or the I) does not lead 
to improvement of the ethical position. On 
Weininger’s opinion a human must see and 
psychologically recognize his own singularity 
and that he is entitled to have his own “I”. 
“Ernst Mach is in great error when he denies the 
subject, and thinks it is only after renunciation 
if the individual “I” that an ethical relation, 
which excludes neglect of the strange “I” and 
overestimation of the individual “I”, may be 
expected… The I is the fundamental ground of 
all social morality. I should never be able to place 
myself, as an actual psychological being, in an 
ethical relation to a mere bundle of elements. It 
is possible to imagine such a relationship; but it is 
entirely opposed to practical conduct; because it 
eliminates the psychological condition necessary 
for making the moral idea an actual reality”29. 
Wieninger’s critique shows to a great extent 
characteristic of the Austrian philosophical 
tradition in relation to German personality 
concept, history and direction of development 
in general. This tradition is based on religious 
confrontation of Protestantism and Catholicism 
which is manifested already not at the level 
of religious beliefs, but at the level of world 
views, philosophical discussions and as a 
certain religious culture determining attitudes 
and representations. Weininger is unique in the 
sense that he converts not to Catholicism, but 
to Protestantism. Weininger by consciously 
accepting christening according to Lutheran 
ceremony being Austrian of Jewish origin has 
symbolically renounced in such a way Austrian 
idea and become a cosmopolite. As Protestantism 
supposes a relation to German spirit, German 
philosophy, thus it connects Weininger with 
Kant’s ideas who established ethical principle of 
unlimited freedom of mind. 
In this case certain social and political 
situation is also opposed to some extent. At that 
time the social structure and political relations 
in Austrian and in Vienna in particular were 
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far not simple. Having Jewish origin Weininger 
as a representative of the Vienna intellectual 
elite did not feel free and first of all he did not 
feel intellectually free, because there was a 
bureaucratic censorship and certain limitations. 
Having chosen Evangelic confession Weininger 
renounced his official motherland Austria and that 
culture those social conditions in which he lived. 
He chose another confession, but this choice was 
not so much religious as philosophical. Weininger 
has chosen in such a way more freedom in 
philosophy which is without squabbles and public 
fuss. Weininger embodies in his fate the identity 
drama and shows brightly that escalated conflict 
which right originates in Austrian history and 
philosophical tradition. 
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«Зал ожидания ощущений»:  
критика махистского понятия «я»  
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Статья посвящена анализу критики Отто Вейнингером анти-эссенциалистского понятия 
«Я», данного Эрнстом Махом в его работе «Анализ ощущений». Отмечается, что критика 
О. Вейнингером махистского понятия «Я» основана на учении немецкого философа Г.В. Лейбница 
о монадах, а также что она в значительной мере отражает особенность австрийской 
философской традиции относительно германского концепта личности и истории, которая 
заключается в религиозном противоборстве протестантизма и католицизма. Уникальность 
Вейнингера состоит в том, что, приняв протестантизм, он таким образом отказался от 
австрийской идеи и сделал выбор в пользу немецкой философии, объединившей его с идеями 
Канта, который утвердил этический принцип предельной свободы разума. 
Ключевые слова: австрийская философия, понятие «Я», комплекс ощущений, элементы, 
монада, гений, гениальность, этический принцип.
